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CASE NOTES

CRIMINAL LAW-Recidivist Procedure-Admissibility of Evidence of Prior
Convictions Before a Finding on the Principal Charge. Spiker v.
State, 427 P.2d 858 (Wyo. 1967).

Oscar Spiker, having been convicted of a felony
on four previous occasions, was convicted of breaking and
entering in violation of Wyoming statutes.1 The determination of his sentencing was, therefore, subject to the Wyoming
Habitual Criminal Act.' In the trial in the District Court,
Park County, evidence of the earlier convictions, which
would certainly prejudice the jury against Spiker, was presented without objection from his attorney. On appeal the
submission of the evidence of previous convictions was challenged. It was contended that presentation of such evidence
deprived the defendant of the substantial and fundamental
right to be tried by an impartial jury. The Supreme Court
of Wyoming held that presentation to the jury of defendant's
prior criminal record, before the jury had reached a verdict
on the principal offense, was not prejudicial error.
The Court cited Waxler v. State' as precedent in Wyoming concerning the procedure to be followed. The Waxler
decision has the effect of supporting the view that evidence
of prior convictions presented before a finding on the trial
in chief is not prejudicial error. However, the court never
squarely discussed this question. After considering the question,4 the court merely stated the general rule' that the prior
convictions must be included in the information so that the
defendant may be adequately prepared to defend against these
charges.' No mention was made by the court concerning the
legitimacy of the procedure of allowing evidence of prior
convictions to be presented in the trial before decision on the
principal charge is made.
The Wyoming Court in Spiker also cited Spencer v.
State" a recent United States Supreme Court decision concerning three consolidated Texas cases which on appeal
1. Wyo. STAT. §§ 6-129 to -131 (1957).

§§ 6-9 to -11 (1957).
3. 67 Wyo. 396, 224 P.2d 514 (1950).
4. Id. at 518.
5. The court here cites 58 A.L.R. 64 and 58 A.L.R. 66 where the discussion
of the rule, that prior convictions must be included in the information,
is found.
6. Waxier v. State, 8upra note 3, at 519.
7. 87 S. Ct. 648 (1967).
2. Wyo. STAT.
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charged that the allegation and reading of the prior offenses
and evidence thereof was prejudicial error. In a five to
four decision the United States Supreme Court did affirm
the Spencer decision. This affirmation, however, was not
based upon the rightness of the Texas procedure, which was
changed subsequent to the Spencer case.' The decision was,
rather, based on the reasoning that the United States Supreme
Court will not determine rules of criminal procedure for the
states.' The court cites Mr. Justice Cardozo's statement that
a state rule of law "does not run foul of the Fourteenth
Amendment because another method may seem to our thinking to be fairer or wiser or to give a surer promise of protection to the prisoner at the bar.""0
In dictum the majority indicated that if the matter were
before them in a legislative or rule making context they
would likely agree that the English-Connecticut procedure is
fairest. 1 Mr. Justice Stewart supported this statement in
his concurring opinion. He stated that "it is clear that the
recidivist procedures adopted in many states are far superior
to those utilized in the case [before us].""
Mr. Chief Justice Warren in his 'dissent stated that although he recognized the basis of the majority decision, the
Supreme Court had long recognized the importance of courtroom procedures in maintaining constitutional liberties. 3
The dissent contended that "the use of prior convictions
evidence in these cases is fundamentally at odds with traditional notions of due process ... because it needlessly prejudices the accused without advancing any legitimate interest
of the state."' 4 By the ordinary rule of evidence it is prejudicial error for the state to allude to, or to attempt to
prove, prior convictions at the trial of the defendant for
the present crime." This rule is based upon the rationale
that the defendant is being tried only for the principal crime
and evidence concerning previous convictions would unduly
8.

TEx. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 36.01 (1960).

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Spencer v. State, supra note 7, at 654.
Id.
Id. at 655.
Id. at 656.
Id. at 657.
Id.
15. J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 192 (3d ed. 1940).
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prejudice the jury against the defendant.'" There are exceptions which occur, i.e., when defendant takes the stand as a
witness questions concerning previous convictions can be
asked to demonstrate his credibility, or when defendant initiates an inquiry into his character evidence of prior convictions can be used to refute defense witnesses." In these situations the admission of prior crimes evidence rests on the
conclusion that the probative value of the evidence outweighs
the conceded possibility of prejudice. 8
These exceptions should not give rise to faulty reasoning
that the recidivist statute has similar relation to the issue of
guilt for the present crime. The recidivist statute is valid
only for the purpose of enhancing the penalty; it has nothing
whatever to do with the question of guilt or innocence of the
crime currently charged.1"
The majority of states (thirty) have amended their recidivist procedure either by statute or judicial determination
in order to cure the prejudice inherent in the procedure followed by the court in Spiker."
One of the earliest decisions which held that it was
unduly prejudicial to admit evidence of prior convictions
before conviction of the present crime is Ferrone v. State.2 '
This Connecticut case outlined a procedure which followed
that prescribed by an English statute.2 Under this procedure
the information charging the present offense includes the
allegation of recidivism and is divided into two parts. However, while notice is given, as to prior conviction in the pleading, only the allegation of the present crime is proved to
the jury. The jury upon retiring is given only the first part
of the information which includes this charge. If a verdict
of guilty is returned, the jury, without reswearing, is then
given the second part of the information in which the former
16. Id.
17. See generally exceptions set out in C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 157 (1954).
18. Id.
19. See J. WIGMORE, supra note 15.
20. Spencer v. State, 8upra note 7, at 665 n.11, e.g. Robertson v. State, 29 Ala.

App. 399, 197 So. 73 (1940) ; State v. Stewart, 110 Utah 203, 171 P.2d 383
(1946) ; Heinze v. State, 127 Colo. 54, 253 P.2d 596 (1953).
21. 96 Conn. 160, 113 A. 452 (1921).
22. Coinage Offenses Act of 1861, 24 & 25 Vict., c.99.
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convictions are alleged.2 8 This is the procedure which is
generally followed by the thirty states.
Since Ferrone there have been a number of jurisdictions
which by judicial determination have accepted its procedure.
Some of the more recent cases are Heinze v. State, 5 Harrisv.
State,28 and Lane v. Warden.2 '
In Heinze the court held that the use of proof of convictions of previous offenses cannot obtain until the guilt of
the substantive offense on trial is established. It further
stated that if a charge of a previous conviction was brought
before testimony by the defendant or other means of opening
the door to proof of prior convictions the prejudicial error
would not be cured even if defendant subsequently testifie'd
on his own behalf. 8
The Harriscourt stated that: "no one can deny that reading an information to a jury reciting numerous previous convictions has a strong tendency to destroy the presumption of
innocence."2 9 The court then overruled any other procedure
and determined that the procedure to be followed in Oklahoma
0
was that of England and Ferronev. State."
The United States Court of Appeals after an exhaustive
review of case law concerning recidivist procedure stated in
Lane v. Warden that "the revelation of Lane's [defendant's]
prior convictions to the jury prior to the finding of guilt
on the current charges was entirely unnecessary. Alternative
procedures which were well known included the Connecticut
practice . . . and the West Virginia statutory practice." 81
The court reached the conclusion that reading of the portion
of the indictment relating to prior convictions, at the commencement of Lane's trial, destroyed the impartiality of the
jury and denied him due process of law."2
23. Ferrone v. State, supra note 21, at 457.
24. E.g. McAllister v. Commonwealth, 157 Va. 844, 161 S.E. 67 (1931) ; Robertson v. State, 29 Ala. App. 399, 197 So. 73 (1940); State v. Stewart, 110
Utah 203, 171 P.2d 883 (1946); Heinze v. State, 127 Colo. 54, 253 P.2d
596 (1953); Harris v. State, 369 P.2d 596 (Okla. Crim. 1962); and Lane v.
Warden, 320 F.2d 179 (4th Cir. 1963).
25. 27 Colo. 54, 253 P.2d 596 (1953).
26. 369 P.2d 187 (Okla. 1966).
27. 320 F.2d 179 (4th Cir. 1963).
28. Heinze v. State, supra note 25, at 599.
29. Harris v. State, supra note 26, at 193.
30. Id. at 195.
31. Lane v. Warden, supra note 27, at 185.
32. Id. at 187.
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The result in Spiker also seems to be entirely unnecessary.
The court failed to look to the trend of the majority of jurisdictions. It failed to adopt a procedure which would protect
the defendant against partiality and insure observance of
due process of law. The decision of the court was based instead upon prior cases which did not squarely answer the
question regarding the admissibility of evidence of prior convictions before a finding on the principal charge.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter has stated that, "the history of
individual liberty is largely coincident with the history of the
observance of procedural safeguards." 3
At a time when such safeguards are being enforced by
the majority of the courts in the United States the decision
in Spiker has fallen short. A change in the recidivist procedure as stated in Spiker should be made to bring the Wyoming procedure in line with the better reasoning of the
majority.
DENNIS L. JONES

38.

Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 164 (1951).
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